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Reflections From the Front Lines:
Ideas and Evidence to Policy
Ray Bosharaa
Let me begin by thanking Dean McKay, Michael
Sherraden, Lissa Johnson, and all the members
of the planning committee for organizing this
excellent conference as well as for the invitation
to offer a few reflections.
I’ve had the good fortune of working with
Michael, Lissa, and many at the Brown School for
over two decades now and am thrilled that our
partnership opportunities have multiplied since I
moved to St. Louis 7 years ago.
My relationship with Michael began in 1990 when,
as an entry-level staffer on the U.S. House Select
Committee on Hunger, I was charged by Chairman
Tony Hall with finding new ideas to end hunger
and poverty, not just alleviate them. My recently
completed divinity school degree had taught me
much about spiritual poverty, but little about
material poverty, so I wasn’t quite sure where
to start. I was inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche’s
doctrine of eternal recurrence, but the only thing
recurring at that moment was the blinking cursor on
my blank screen.
Miraculously, two policy briefs—one written by
the Progressive Policy Institute, the other by
CFED—landed on my desk, both highlighting a
recent Social Service Review article in which
Michael Sherraden (1990) argued that assets,
hitherto neglected in U.S. poverty programs and
policies, were essential to ending hunger and
poverty. Fascinated, I called Michael and invited
a

him to Washington to meet the chairman and me,
but Michael, apparently early in his career and
lacking assets himself, said he couldn’t afford the
trip and was waiting for someone else to foot the
bill. I don’t know who eventually paid for his trip,
but one day he showed up in Washington.
Michael’s seminal idea saved my job and, little
did I know, would shape my professional life as
well. I then spent the better part of the next
20 years trying to make asset building for the
poor a reality in Washington, and it is from this
“frontline” experience that I am pleased to share
a few insights today.1
For the sake of time, and at a great risk of
overgeneralization, I’ve condensed those two
decades into three observations that, in my
experience, matter in moving an idea and evidence
into policy. In many ways, this is a story of policy
innovation as well, since we literally were taking
an idea formulated in the academy—though
commendably grounded in the reality of the lives of
the welfare moms Michael was working with—and
trying to give it life in DC.
***
Perhaps the best way to convey my three
observations is to tell some stories. The lessons
from those stories can be summed as (1) timing
and framing matter; (2) evidence matters,
however … ; and (3) policy entrepreneurs and
policy intermediaries matter.

The views expressed here are my own views. This Perspective presents remarks delivered on September 15, 2016, during Social
Innovation for America’s Renewal, a policy conference of the Grand Challenges for Social Work initiative. The conference was
organized by the Center for Social Development at Washington University in collaboration with the American Academy of Social
Work & Social Welfare.

1. Timing and Framing Matter

eager to solve. So, while we cannot all be Wayne
Gretzky and know where the puck will be, this is
the art at the intersection of ideas, evidence, and
policy: anticipating a political moment and having
your idea, framing, and evidence ready to go.

Ideas have merit in and of themselves, but their
reception depends on their relevance to a time and
place. I recall reading that the three recipients of
the 2011 Nobel Prize in Chemistry were initially
ridiculed by their peers because their ideas seemed
so outrageous when first proposed.

2. Evidence Matters, However …
Speaking of evidence, this brings me to my
second observation: Evidence matters, however.…

Our field is no different. Many of you may be
surprised to learn that it was primarily liberal
scholars, advocates, and policymakers who were
largely hostile to Michael’s ideas because they
claimed to know what the poor needed and were
capable of—certainly not accumulating savings and
wealth. Meanwhile, Republicans, conservatives,
and “third way” Democrats, who were eager to
“end welfare as we knew it,” were among the first
to embrace the ideas. Stated simply, policymakers
either believed families couldn’t save because
they were poor, so why bother, or believed
families were poor because they never had the
opportunity to save, so let’s get started.

Let me begin by conveying the rapid evolution
of IDA policy in Congress. Thanks largely to the
leadership of Michael and Bob Friedman of CFED—a
true policy entrepreneur who embraced asset
development enthusiastically and largely built
the field from scratch—funds were raised from
the Ford Foundation and several other national
foundations to test IDAs in 13 sites nationwide
through the American Dream Demonstration, or
ADD. When Senator Coats and others heard about
ADD, the response was not “great idea, let’s see if
it works, and then we’ll consider a larger, federal
demonstration.” No, it was “this idea is too good
to limit to a small, privately funded demonstration,
so I’m going to introduce legislation.” A few years
later, in 1998, the $25 million per year Assets for
Independence Act was signed into law by President
Clinton. Evidence played virtually no role, largely
because there wasn’t any.2

To illustrate, the late-1990s campaign on Capitol
Hill to create a federally funded Individual
Development Account (IDA) demonstration
was passionately led by Senator Dan Coats, a
conservative Indiana Republican. Other advocates
for multibillion-dollar inclusive asset polices
included Senators Jim DeMint, Joe Lieberman,
Rick Santorum, Bill Bradley, and Jeff Sessions, as
well as President George H.W. Bush, Secretary
Jack Kemp, and others.

Then, in 1999, I was invited to brief Senators
Lieberman and Santorum about the idea, and
their response was not “great idea, let’s see how
these two demonstration projects turn out.”
Instead, it was “this idea is too good to limit to
any demonstration project, so we’re going to
introduce a $10 billion dollar tax credit to make
IDAs reach millions nationwide.” The Savings for
Working Families Act, less than year later, came
within an inch of becoming law but died when
the larger bill it was attached to fell apart.3

Interestingly, that same Senator Coats today no
longer supports the government-funded IDAs
he once championed because the dominant
idea among many Republicans is no longer
ending welfare, but ending government. Today,
Republicans have largely but not completely
retreated from progressive, multibillion-dollar
asset-building proposals while Democrats, eager
to respond to growing inequality, have now
largely embraced them.

Again, though we now had a little, evidence
played no role in achieving this near policy
victory. Similarly, a few years later, the
bipartisan, bicameral, multibillion-dollar ASPIRE
Act,4 which would automatically create Child
Development Accounts (CDAs) at birth for all
children, was introduced in the House and
Senate—the very year a privately funded CDA
demonstration project was launched, meaning
evidence played no role in generating this bill’s
introduction. Members just loved the idea.

Note that, throughout all those years, the idea
has not changed at all. But the timing and
framing (or context) have. A seasoned lobbyist
once told me that the three most important
things in politics are timing, timing, and timing.
As the welfare reform and inequality examples
illustrate, the good ideas that will move in the
future will be ripe for a political moment and
framed as a problem that Congress is already
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Obama White House to nudge us all to better
health, wealth, and happiness.

The Clinton administration also appeared eager
to expand asset building. In early January 1999,
Michael relayed preliminary, nonexperimental
evidence to the White House that low-income
families in ADD could in fact save—the key policy
doubt at the time—and that they were saving
about $30 a month. The result: a nearly $400
billion dollar retirement-focused IDA called
Universal Savings Accounts, which President
Clinton announced in the 1999 State of the
Union address.5 OK, the evidence mattered,
but the magnitude of the proposal was hardly
commensurate with the evidence! In fact, the
morning after the State of the Union, the White
House called and said, “OK, Ray, we’ve teed this
thing up for you, now you tell us how it will work.”
They had no idea. I’m not sure we did either.

In the end, though, saving and asset-building
policies were going nowhere in the early years
of the Obama administration precisely because
the evidence suggested that low- and moderateincome Americans can save; the imperative
then, following the Great Recession, was to get
precisely those families to spend. Moreover,
families and policymakers were spooked by
asset building for the poor given that the Great
Recession had eviscerated $16 trillion of family
wealth, including the wealth of the very people
the field had aimed to serve.
But that very crisis also birthed the most
significant, unanticipated asset-building
institution yet created: the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, or CFPB. The field is now
highly engaged with the CFPB on a range of assetbuilding strategies, including those promoting
financial capability, tax-time savings, and CDAs,
and evidence is central to those efforts.

Clearly, enthusiasm for the idea overwhelmed
any evidence, leading to the policies getting
way ahead of the practice. (As an aside, I think
it’s completely reversed now; the practice is
way ahead of the policy). But evidence did,
nonetheless, play a very constructive role: While
it had little to do with getting IDA and CDA
policies introduced or passed, it had a lot to do
with getting those policies right. As opportunities
arose to revise IDA and CDA legislation and laws
in Congress and state legislatures, evidence from
IDAs, CDAs, and other experiments were crucial.

In summary, then, policy can move (or not
move!) because of the evidence, indifferent to
the evidence, and (in some instances) despite
the evidence. I think our job as researchers,
academics, policy experts, advocates, and
others is to conduct rigorous, forward-looking
experiments rooted in the realities of people’s
lives—to generate the best possible evidence. It
is a commitment, I’m sure, that runs deep in this
room today. That evidence will then, ideally, spur
policy development or, at least—and, critically—
get a policy right over the longer term.

But this story yields another interesting
observation about evidence: how different
administrations and policymakers have viewed it. I
would describe the Clinton administration, as just
illustrated, as “eager for evidence in support of
ideas we love”; the George W. Bush administration
as “ideology trumps evidence”; and the Obama
administration as “evidence, evidence, and more
evidence, please.” In my meetings at the Bush
White House, it was always about the idea of
building wealth and how that reduces dependency
on government, fosters financial freedom, and
leads to an ownership society.6

3. Policy Entrepreneurs and
Policy Intermediaries Matter
The impact of evidence on policy, then, cannot
be understood apart from the political and
economic moment in which that evidence is
presented. It’s hard to know when, or how, an
idea will have impact, or when you have an
opportunity to “go to scale.” But many other
things matter in moving an idea forward, in
generating policy impact.

A few years later, my meetings at the Obama
White House, reliably with Harvard, Chicago,
and Princeton economics professors, made me
grateful for my grueling degree from the Kennedy
School. To them, ideology (or, for that matter,
asset building) mattered little, but ideas backed
by rigorous research mattered a lot. In fact,
as many of you know, a team of data-obsessed
behavioral economists was brought into the

Many of the these are quite familiar to you:
calls, letters, media strategies, hearings, onepagers, grass-roots and grass-tops organizing,
coalition building, etc. However, the ones that
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So, Phil and I wondered: If we are in fact now
seeing a once-in-a-century convergence of political,
economic, technological, demographic, and social
forces, could large-scale reform be on our horizon?
Could we achieve what they achieved, and what
could we learn from them? Does history rhyme, as
Mark Twain apparently once said?

may be less familiar but, in my view, actually
essential to policy success are the roles of policy
entrepreneurs (such Bob Friedman) and policy
intermediaries (such as New America, Brookings
Institution, American Enterprise Institute,
Heritage Foundation, Corporation for Enterprise
Development, Cato Institute, the DC-based trade
associations, and many others). Perhaps needless
to say, the foundations and donors that support
their work are essential as well, with the best of
donors serving as thought partners.

It just so happens that I’ll be selling my book at
lunch today if you’d like to know the answer!
I wish we had time to explore this, but what was
clear was that research, experimentation, and
evidence were central to the development and
adoption of Progressive Era ideas—and these ideas
led to many enduring reforms that exceeded the
ambitions of their most visionary progenitors.

These policy shops have their ear to the ground for
opportunities; play an essential “translation” role
between research, evidence, and policy; can write
and place timely, high-impact op-eds; and are
often skilled at reaching—if not being an essential
part of—the surprisingly small policy communities
in DC that have a disproportionate effect on the
policymaking process. They excel at organizing
money and people around promising ideas.

I doubt that the leaders of the Wisconsin Idea,
including Charles van Hise and Robert La Follette,
though they aimed to have their experiments
inspire other states, could have imagined the
scope of their impact on the Progressive Era,
New Deal, and beyond. Nor could Jane Addams
and Ellen Gates Starr, following their 1888 tour
of settlement houses in London, have imagined
that the Hull House they would establish in
Chicago a year later would launch the social work
profession in the United States, or that Addams
would go on to win the Nobel Prize.

In fact, my own story illustrates an open secret:
Many members of Congress and their staff rely on
think tanks and intermediaries to do the thinking
and bill writing they don’t have the time or
expertise to do. Congress needs them. But, having
worked in think tanks as well, let me let you in on
a less open secret: The think tanks often need you;
they need ideas—they need academics, researchers,
and analysts who’ve thought long and hard about
key issues. They need you and the ideas this Grand
Challenges conference are meant to generate.

It’s hard to know, of course, whether the
research, reforms, and ideas under discussion
today will have the impact of earlier leaders and
reformers. But I commend you all for articulating
some of the nation’s key Grand Challenges and
the education, research, and advocacy agendas
that go along with them. As I mentioned earlier,
the real art of policy impact lies in anticipating a
political moment and having your idea, framing,
and evidence ready to go. I believe that such
a moment is upon us and, thanks to the Grand
Challenges conference and similar efforts, you
are well prepared to make a difference.

I understand that Washington University is
deepening its already historical ties with the
Brookings Institution. Whether, as outlined in
the policy briefs, you aim to build financial
capability, ensure healthy development for all
youth, close the health gap, or reduce extreme
economic inequality, Brookings and other policy
intermediaries, and the policy entrepreneurs that
drive them, can be critical to your success.
***

Thank you.

Let me close by looking back even further than the
last two decades. In 2009, I had the pleasure of
publishing a book, The Next Progressive Era, which I
coauthored with my former New America colleague,
Phil Longman. Our view was that the conditions
leading up to the remarkable accomplishments of
the Progressive Era—that 30-year period beginning
with the depression of the early 1890s—were
remarkably similar to our own today.

End Notes
1. My remarks were informed by Michael
Sherraden’s 2000 paper, From Research to Policy:
Lessons from Individual Development Accounts,
later published in the Journal of Consumer
Affairs, as well as by a 2012 paper I published
for the Center for Social Development: From
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Asset Building to Balance Sheets: A Reflection
on the First and Next 20 Years of Federal Assets
Policy (Boshara, 2012). Both papers are available
at http://www.csd.wustl.edu.
Although this isn’t evidence, one of the three IDA
programs in existence at the time was offering
eight-to-one matches, which is unheard of now
but nonetheless remains in law today. This is one
example of the practice being way ahead of the
policy. For the Assets for Independence Act of
1998, see Pub. L. No. 105-285, 112 Stat. 2759–
2772 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2014)).
Savings for Working Families Act, S. 895, 106th
Cong. (1999).
ASPIRE (America Saving for Personal
Investment, Retirement, and Education) Act of
2004, S. 2751, 108th Cong. (2004).
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress
on the State of the Union, 1 Pub. Papers 62, 63
(January 19, 1999).
We welcomed the ownership society idea and
framework but worked hard to make sure it
was ownership for those who owned little or
nothing. Still, our embrace of that framing
caused great consternation among our fragile
allies on the left—consternation that we were
somehow pawns in the political right’s effort
to privatize Social Security and other core
elements of the 20th century welfare stare.

Ray Boshara worked in Washington, DC, for nearly
20 years. He served as vice president of New
America, policy director of the Corporation for
Enterprise Development, and a domestic policy
staff member of the House Select Committee on
Hunger in the U.S. Congress.
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